COP25 in search of lost time for action : an assessment of the Madrid climate conference by Obergassel, Wolfgang et al.
Wolfgang Obergassel, Christof Arens, Christiane Beuermann,  
Lukas Hermwille, Nicolas Kreibich, Hermann E. Ott, Meike Spitzner 
COP 25 in Search of 
Lost Time for Action 
An Assessment of the 
Madrid Climate Conference 
Originally published in: 
Carbon & Climate Law Review, 
14 (2020), 1, pp. 3-17 
DOI: 10.21552/cclr/2020/1/4 
 
Wolfgang Obergassel a* 
Christof Arens a 
Christiane Beuermann a 
Lukas Hermwille a,b 
Nicolas Kreibich a 
Hermann E. Ott c 
Meike Spitzner a 
Hanna Wang-Helmreich a 
COP25 in Search of  
Lost Time for Action 
An Assessment of the 
Madrid Climate Conference 
 
 
a Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie gGmbH, 
Germany 
b VA Amsterdam 
c ClientEarth 
  
* Corresponding author: 
Wolfgang Obergassel 




 E-mail: wolfgang.obergassel@wupperinst.org 
Phone: +49 202 2492 149 
Fax: +49 202 2492 250 
 
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication. Changes 
resulting from the publishing process, such as editing, corrections and structural 
formatting, may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made 
to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was sub-
sequently published in the Journal cited above. 
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Meike Spitzner* 
Abstract 
Last year's conference of the global climate change regime took place from 2 until 15 Decem-
ber 2019 in Madrid, Spain. Despite marking a new record for overtime in the history of the 
UNFCCC, the conference did not only fail to meet the increasing public demand for swift and 
strong climate action. It also failed on its formal mandate to finalise the Paris rulebook. A rec-
ord number of issues were left unresolved and shelved for the next session. COP25 thereby 
highlighted how much work still lies ahead both domestically and internationally if 2020 is to 
see a step-up in climate action that is consistent with the long-term goal of the Paris Agree-
ment.  
I. Introduction
Setting a new record for overtime, the 25th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) came to a close at 1:55PM on 
Sunday, 15 December, 44 hours later than its scheduled end. During its two weeks of dura-
tion, the conference once again highlighted the limitations of a consensus-based regime, 
which provides ample opportunity to blockers to hold up the entire process.  
The COP presidency had run the conference on the theme “time for action”. The most im-
portant topics of the conference included raising climate ambition, finishing the implementing 
rules of the Paris Agreement, and supporting developing countries in dealing with loss and 
damage due to the impacts of climate change. 
In practice, as at most previous COPs, much of the conference was dominated by deliberate 
foot dragging and re-stating of old positions. However, while in previous years the overtime 
had been due to ambitious countries wanting more than recalcitrant countries were willing to 
concede, this year overtime was needed to fend off attemps to undermine the integrity of the 
entire Paris Agreement, particularly in the areas of calling for increased ambition as well as 
ensuring the integrity of international carbon trading under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. In 
the end, the COP was once more not able to send a strong signal on the need for enhancing 
ambition. And again, Parties could not agree on the remaining implementation rules for the 
Paris Agreement, in particular common timeframes for Parties’ nationally determined contribu-
tions (NDCs) and rules for cooperative action under Article 6 of the agreement. –––– 
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The amount of foot-dragging was epitomised by a record number of applications of Rule 16 of 
the draft rules of procedure. Rule 16 applies when Parties cannot come to any agreement on 
an agenda item, not even a procedural . Rule 16 stipulates that if an agenda item remains 
unresolved, it is automatically included in the agenda of the next session.1  
COP25 thereby highlighted how much work still lies ahead both domestically and internation-
ally if 2020 is to see a step-up in climate action that is consistent with the long-term goal of 
the Paris Agreement. COP26 is by many seen as a crucial litmus test whether the Paris ap-
proach works or not. If the process in 2020 fails to substantially strengthen national contribu-
tions, civil society and the most ambitious countries should initiate negotiations on a “fast 
track” – a parallel regime to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. 
II. Raising Ambition 
1. Ambition Pre- and Post-2020 
The Paris outcome requires the Parties to the Paris Agreement whose initial NDC covers the 
time period up to 2025 to communicate a new NDC by 2020, while Parties whose NDCs cov-
er the period up to 2030 are required “to communicate or update” these contributions by 
2020.2 Given the lack of climate ambition most countries have so far exhibited, the question in 
Madrid was whether the conference would send a strong signal on the need for all countries 
to strengthen their contributions. While the Paris Agreement in Article 4.3 mandates that 
NDCs should reflect a Party’s “highest possible ambition”, in previous sessions many Parties 
had disputed that the 2020 round of re-submitting NDCs entailed a requirement to increase 
ambition.3 
In the run-up to the conference, 68 Parties had signalled that they intended to strengthen their 
contributions. However, most of these Parties were small island states and less developed 
countries. Collectively, they account for only about 8% of global emissions. At the end of the 
conference, the number of Parties had risen to 80, covering 10% of global emissions.4 Of the 
major emitters, none has so far clearly signalled their intention to increase their ambition. And 
while on 13 December the European Council agreed that the EU will aim to become climate-
neutral by 2050, what this will mean for near-term ambition still needs to be worked out. 
As at previous COPs, the negotiations in Madrid were burdened by the legacy of decades of 
insufficient climate policy. The contributions under the Paris Agreement apply only from 2020 
onwards. Climate action up until 2020 has been governed by the decisions adopted under the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol at the conferences in Cancún, Durban and Doha in 2010-
2012. The Paris Agreement has taken a nuanced approach to differentiating what is expected 
from Parties according to their national circumstances. By contrast, the rules covering the pe-
riod up to 2020 have been strongly based on the “bifurcation” established by the UNFCCC, 
requiring developed countries to take the lead on climate action while expecting only volun-
tary actions from developing countries. Developing countries have for years voiced dissatis-
faction with the level of action of developed countries, both relating to the level of emission 
reductions as well as to the provision of financial, technological and capacity building support 
–––– 
1 UNFCCC ‘Draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties and its Subsidiary Bodies’ UN Doc FCCC/CP/1996/2, 22 May 1996. 
2  UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016), para 23f. 
3  See e.g. Wolfgang Obergassel, Christof Arens, Lukas Hermwille, Nicolas Kreibich, Hermann Ott, and Hanna Wang-Helmreich. ‘Paris 
Agreement: Ship Moves Out of the Drydock’. Carbon and Climate Law Review 13, no. 01 (2019): 3–18. 
https://doi.org/10.21552/cclr/2019/1/4. 
4  2020 NDC Tracker, <https://www.climatewatchdata.org/2020-ndc-tracker> accessed 11 Februar 2020 
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to developing countries. According to reports presented at the conference there is indeed a 
severe risk that the pledge by developed countries to mobilise USD 100 billion annually from 
2020 will be missed. 
In Madrid, the G-77 once again pointed out that pre-2020 action was the basis for post-2020 
action. The Group of Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs)5 took a particularly hard 
line, outlining that in their view the “pre-2020 period” was not about timescales, but about am-
bition. In their view, the pre-2020 period would only be finished when commitments had been 
delivered. The lack of effort developed countries had so far shown must in their view not be 
redistributed across all Parties. The LMDCs therefore demanded that a 2-year work pro-
gramme should be undertaken under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to take detailed 
stock of the efforts made so far, and to discuss a way forward for how developed country Par-
ties could make good on their commitments. However, most other developing countries did 
not support this hard line. While they regretted the lack of ambition exhibited by developed 
countries, in their view future ambition from all countries should not be conditional on the 
treatment of the pre-2020 period.  
The final outcome of the conference ties ambition pre- and post-2020 together as had been 
demanded by the LMDCs. Both the COP and the CMA (Parties to the Paris Agreement) re-
emphasize “with serious concern the urgent need to address the significant gap between the 
aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation efforts in terms of global annual emissions of green-
house gases by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways consistent with holding the increase 
in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”.6 In addition, the 
COP decision also recalls the USD 100 billion commitment and emphasises that developing 
countries still face challenges in accessing support. COP26 will feature a round table on pre-
2020 implementation and ambition including Parties and non-Party stakeholders.  
On the question of NDC revision, the penultimate version of the text proposed by the Chilean 
presidency on 14 December merely reiterated the invitation to Parties to communicate their 
NDCs. This draft provoked strong reactions from many Parties who demanded to adopt a 
clear requirement to raise ambition. However, in the end it was not possible to include such 
clear language in the decision. Instead, the final decision recalls the request to re-submit ex-
isting NDCs or submit new or updated NDCs and surrounds it with general statements on the 
need to raise ambition. Furthermore, the decision recalls that the Secretariat is requested to 
prepare a synthesis report of the NDC submissions, and requests the Secretariat to make this 
report available to COP26.7 
Finally, a decision by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol “strongly urges Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol that have yet to ratify the Doha Amendment” to do so as soon as possible.8 The Do-
ha Amendment contains commitments for industrialised countries for the period 2013-2020 
but has not yet entered into force due to an insufficient number of ratifications. 
On adaptation, the CMA encourages Parties to submit their first adaptation communication as 
soon as possible and to engage in adaptation planning processes and implementation of ac-
–––– 
5  The group of like-minded developing countries includes China, India, and other Asian countries such as Malaysia, countries in the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries such as Saudi Arabia, and some Latin American countries such as Venezuela. 
6  UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.25, Chile Madrid Time for Action’ Advance unedited version para 3; UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CMA.2, Chile Madrid 
Time for Action’ Advance unedited version paras 8 and 5 respectively. 
7  UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CMA.2, Chile Madrid Time for Action’ Advance unedited version. 
8  UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CMP.15, Chile Madrid Time for Action’ Advance unedited version, para 4. 
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tions. The decision requests the Adaptation Committee to work on approaches for reviewing 
overall progress in achieving the Paris Agreement’s global goal on adaptation and to include 
the outcome of this work in its 2021 annual report.9 
In summary, the decision essentially only reiterates the provisions that had already been 
agreed in Paris. The conference was not able to send a clear signal that all Parties will need 
to strengthen their contributions if achievement of the objectives of the Paris Agreement is to 
be kept within reach. 
2. Non-Party Actors 
The annual COP has become an event that holds importance for a far wider range of actors 
than national governments. It has become an annual fair for climate action. This is partly due 
to the fact that since 2014, the UNFCCC Secretariat and the subsequent COP Presidencies 
have sought ways to “orchestrate” non-state and subnational actors and initiatives to contrib-
ute to climate action. Inter alia the Secretariat has established the Nonstate Actor Zone for 
Climate Action (NAZCA), an online database/registry in which in the meantime a whopping 
17,000 actors have registered their climate change mitigation and/or adaptation commit-
ments. An annual Yearbook of Global Climate Action provides a more detailed analysis of the 
activities.10  
Furthermore, the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (GCA) was established to 
coordinate activities. Two “high-level champions” nominated by consecutive COP Presiden-
cies are working with the Secretariat to advance activities. Among other things an impressive 
set of sectoral Climate Action Pathways has been developed for various thematic areas (en-
ergy, human settlements, industry, land use, oceans and coastal zones, transport, water) as 
well as resillience as a cross-cutting area. Each of these pathways consists of an executive 
summary as well as an “action table” containing good practices collated from participating 
non-state and subnational actors. These climate action pathways hold significant potential 
and could also inform national governments. Yet, the series of sectoral action events took 
place only at the margins of COP25 and did not attract much attention from international me-
dia nor from negotiators and national governments. As in previous years, they have been per-
ceived largely as a side note of the intergovernmental negotiations.  
While these activities have been largely perceived as a success, their continuation was 
somewhat uncertain. The GCA originated from a stream of negotiations targetting the en-
hancement of pre 2020 climate action and hence had only a mandate until 2020. At COP25, 
Parties decided to extend this mandate until 2025 including the mandate for consecutive COP 
Presidencies to nominate high-level champions.11  
3. Periodic Review of the Long-Term Goal 
As part of the Cancún Agreements, parties agreed to “periodically review the adequacy of the 
long-term global goal referred to in paragraph 4 above, in the light of the ultimate objective of 
the Convention, and overall progress towards achieving it”.12 A first such review was conduct-
–––– 
9 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CMA.2, Chile Madrid Time for Action’ Advance unedited version, paras 12-14. 
10 United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2019 (2019) 
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GCA_Yearbook2019.pdf> accessed 11 Februar 2020 
11 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.25, Chile Madrid Time for Action’ Advance unedited version, para 27-29. 
12 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention’ UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011), paras 138-140. 
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ed in the 2013-2015 period and was instrumental in inserting the 1.5°C target into the negotia-
tions. Specifically, in a series of structured expert dialogues, the consulted experts concluded 
that 2°C of global warming cannot be considered a safe level in accordance withe objectives 
of the Convention to avoid dangerous climate change. After some resistance, the conclusions 
were adopted paving the way for the inclusion of the 1.5°C target in the Paris Agreement.13  
Defining the scope of the second periodic review was in order already at COP24, but was in-
tentionally postponed in order to first adopt the modalities of the Global Stocktake as part of 
the Paris Agreement rulebook. After all, the mandate of the Global Stocktake is very similar to 
the one of the periodic review. Consequently, many developed countries initially proposed to 
permanently close the periodic review to avoid duplication.14 This was opposed by developing 
countries highlighting the complementarity to the GST. Particularly important was that the pe-
riodic review would take place under the Convention, not under the Paris Agreement, and 
would hence include Parties that are not part of the PA, particularly the United States. 
Ultimately, Parties decided to go ahead with the second periodic review beginning in the se-
cond half of 2020 and holding three structured expert dialogues following the example of the 
successful pre-Paris dialogues in parallel with the 53rd-55th session of the Subsidiary Bodies. 
Specifically, the the periodic review shall review the long-term global goal and scenarios to-
wards achieving it, progress made in relation to addressing information and knowledge gaps 
since the previous review, and review challenges and opportunities for achieving the long-
term global goal with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the Convention.15 This 
latter mandate is particularly interesting as it goes beyond what has been considered for the 
Global Stocktake. Assesssing systematically economic, technlogical, political/institutional as 
well as capacity/awareness-related transformation challenges is to date not considered for the 
Global Stocktake, but could provide valuable insights in how to advance both domestic im-
plementation as well as the enabling international governance.16 
III. The Paris Rulebook 
1. Cooperative Approaches under Article 6 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes three approaches for countries to cooperate with 
each other:  
First, Parties may directly engage in ‘cooperative approaches’ and transfer ‘internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes’ (ITMOs) under Articles 6.2 of the agreement. Second, a new 
mechanism ‘to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustain-
able development’ is established under Articles 6.4. Third, Article 6.8 provides for non-market 
approaches to be used. 
The rules for all three forms of cooperation under Article 6 were the last chapter of the Paris 
rulebook that could not be finalized in Katowice. Pressure to come to an agreement in Madrid 
was thus high, as were Parties’ stakes involved in the negotiations: while a number of coun-
tries are advocating rules that would allow them to achieve individual short-term benefits, oth-–––– 
13 Obergassel et al.: Phoenix from the Ashes – Analysis of the Paris Agreement to the UNFCCC, 28 ELM 2016 
14 IISD Reporting Services. ‘Summary of the Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference: 2-15 December 2019’. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 
12, no. 775 (2019). https://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12775e.pdf. 
15 Decision -/CP.25, Scope of the next periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards 
achieving it, Advance unedited version. 
16 Hermwille, Lukas, Anne Siemons, Hannah Förster, and Louise Jeffery. 2019. ‘Catalyzing Mitigation Ambition under the Paris Agreement: 
Elements for an Effective Global Stocktake’. Climate Policy 19 (8): 988–1001. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1624494. 
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ers strive to maintain the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement by opposing a sys-
tem that to the fear of many would allow carbon markets to become a large loophole in the 
architecture of the regime. 
After the Katowice failure, Parties had continued to negotiate at SBSTA 50 in Bonn, albeit 
without much progress. In Madrid, Parties continued discussing different text versions under 
SBSTA, again finding no solutions for the crunch issues, see below. When ministerial-level 
negotiations in the second week brought no change to the deadlock, the COP Presidency 
tabled three different propoposals for each of the three approaches for voluntary cooperation 
of varying quality in the final days of the conference, yet none of them succeeded.17 In the 
end, the issue was once again postponed, the presidency texts will be the basis for a restart 
of the negotiations in 2020.18  
Accounting (double counting) 
One particularly contentious issue of the Article 6 negotiations relates to the rules on how to 
account for ITMOs and emission reductions transferred under Article 6.2 and Article 6.4, re-
spectively through so-called “corresponding adjustments”. Robust accounting rules are a 
necessary precondition to ensure that emission reductions are not used more than once 
(double counting), preventing the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement being un-
dermined. Countries made considerable progress in finding technical solutions, for instance 
for dealing with the diversity of Parties’ NDC targets. The final iteration of the Presidency text 
proposes solutions in dealing with different timeframes of Parties’ NDCs (single-year vs. mul-
tiyear targets) as well as for accounting for ITMOs generated outside the scope of NDCs. 
However, in the negotations on the accounting rules of the Article 6.4 mechanism one key 
political issue could not be solved: the question on whether countries will have to fully account 
for the transfer of emission reductions under the Article 6.4 mechanism.  
In Madrid, Brazil continued pushing for Article 6.4 emission reductions exports being partially 
exempt from corresponding adjustments, while most other Parties rejected this approach, 
highlighting that it would lead to double counting of emission reductions and thereby under-
–––– 
17 Presidency proposals on the Article 6.2 guidance:  
UNFCCC ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, 
Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement Version 3 of 15 December 00:50 Hrs’ 
—— ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement:Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Para-
graph 2, of the Paris Agreement Version 1 of 13 December 11:15 Hrs’ 
—— ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement:Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Para-
graph 2, of the Paris Agreement Version 2 of 14 December 09:15 Hrs’ 
Presidency proposals for the rules, modalities and procedures of the Article 6.4 mechanism: 
UNFCCC ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Estab-
lished by Article 6, Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement Version 1 of 13 December 11:45 Hrs’  
—— ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by 
Article 6, Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement Version 2 of 14 December 9:00 Hrs’  
—— ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by 
Article 6, Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement Version 3 of 15 December 1:10 Hrs’  
Presidency proposals for the work programme under the framework for non-market approaches: 
UNFCCC, ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Work Programme under the Framework for Non-Market Ap-
proaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement Version 1 of 13 December 11:15 Hrs’ 
——, ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Work Programme under the Framework for Non-Market Approaches 
Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement Version 2 of 14 December 08:30 Hrs’ 
——, ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Work Programme under the Framework for Non-Market Approaches 
Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement Version 3 of 15 December 00:20 Hrs’ 
 
18  UNFCCC ‘Decision -/CMA.2, Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement’, Advance unedited version. 
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mine the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement. In the course of the two weeks of 
negotiations, Parties were unable to find a solution to the Brazilian position, which was still 
reflected in the draft text tabled by the Presidency during the last hours of the negotiations. 
Thanks to the strong stance of the other countries to defend the environmental integrity of the 
Paris Agreement, the text was not adopted. 
Kyoto Transition 
Another contentious question was how to deal with certificates from the Kyoto Protocol and 
whether countries should be allowed to use these under the Paris Agreement. China, India 
and Brazil, all three countries hosting thousands of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
activities and holding a large amount of CDM units, pushed for these credits to be transitioned 
into the Article 6.4 mechanism. And the negotiations experienced another unprecedented 
move from one of the Parties holding large amounts of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from 
the Kyoto Protocol: Australia strongly advocated for the possibility to use these emission per-
mits for the achievement of NDCs.  
Parties tried to find common ground by limiting the environmental impact of the transition of 
Kyoto units: The draft text tabled by the Presidency during the last hours of the negotiations 
would have allowed the use of CERs if the underlying project was registered after a specific 
point in time. However, the specific date would still have to be determined by the CMA in the 
future.19 If adopted, there would be uncertainty regarding Australia’s approach to use AAUs 
for NDC attainment: A paragraph that would have excluded the use of Kyoto Protocol units 
and which was contained in previous drafts of the Article 6.2 text was not included in the last 
draft proposed by the Presidency.20 
By not adopting the text proposal made by the CMA presidency, Parties impeded a full transi-
tion of CERs and AAUs that would have led to an oversupply of credits in a yet to emerge 
carbon market. Parties further avoided rules that would have allowed Parties to fulfil their al-
ready unambitious NDC targets with certificates from the past.  
Other crunch issues  
Further contentious issues comprised, inter alia, the question of “overall mitigation in global 
emissions (OMGE)”, i.e. making sure that Article 6 activities go beyond mere offsetting in that 
they actively reduce emissions. According to the Paris Agreement, Art. 6.4 activities are to 
include such a component, while Art. 6.2 is silent on this. Thus, one of the contentious issues 
in this regard is whether or not Art. 6.2 should apply this concept as well in order to establish 
a level playing field. The other question is how to operationalize OMGE. The latest text pro-
posals from the presidency suggests for Art. 6.4 to cancel at least 2% of traded mitigation 
outcomes for overall mitigation,21 while in the case of Art. 6.2, Parties are just “strongly en-
couraged” to set aside a portion of their traded mitigation outcomes.22 
–––– 
19 UNFCCC ‘Draft Text on Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism estab-
lished by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement Version 3 of 15 December 1:10 hrs’ Annex, para 75. 
20 See para 51 in the Annex of the first proposal by the Presidency for the Article 6.2 guidance which is missing in the second and third itera-
tion.  
21 UNFCCC ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Estab-
lished by Article 6, Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement Version 3 of 15 December 1:10 Hrs, Annex, para 67 b). 
22 UNFCCC ‘Draft Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 
6, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement Version 3 of 15 December 00:50 Hrs’, Annex, para 39. 
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Parties also have diverging views about environmental and social safeguards in order to pre-
vent that Art. 6 mitigation actions cause harm on the ground, for example when large hydro 
dams comprise possible resettlements. However, even language suggesting that Art. 6 ac-
tions are to respect human rights and rights of indigenous peoples was contentious in Madrid.   
Parties also wrangle about possible levies that could be introduced for mitigation activities in 
order to generate income for adaptation measures, as was the case with the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism. Again, there is a case for equal treatment here, as the Paris Agreement 
only foresees this “share of proceeds” being applied to Art. 6.4. The African Group as well as 
G77 and China demand the share of proceeds covers both Art. 6.2 and 6.4 in order to create 
a reliable revenue stream for Adaptation Fund, while the US as well as the EU fear that such 
a taxation of bilateral activities under Art. 6.2 conflicts with their respective domestic legal sys-
tems.  
All in all, postponing decisions on Article 6 prevented creating potential loopholes with regard 
to accounting and carry-over of Kyoto units and therefore this move was certainly the prefer-
ential option. However, it remains unclear how Parties intend to solve the prevailing conflicts 
given that numerous attempts and years of negotiations have failed to produce consensus. 
On the positive side, a group of countries led by Costa Rica and Switzerland on the penulti-
mate day of the COP launched the ‘San José declaration’ establishing high quality standards 
for integrity of the Art.6 transactions, which quickly gained the support of 31 countries23. Swit-
zerland stated in final plenary it would apply these rules to the Art. 6.2 pilot activities it will 
keep conducting. Whether or not this will create best practice examples eventually becoming 
the norm remains to be seen.  
While some of the key political issues remain unresolved, it should be highlighted that Parties 
made considerable progress on several technical issues. Since the upcoming negotiations will 
continue on the basis of all text proposals of the Presidency, there is a risk that some of the 
progress made could be reversed. Article 6 is at a decisive crossroads with a solution that 
satisfies all is nowhere to be seen. The only thing clear at the moment is that another year of 
exchanging views and discussing pros and cons of well-known options is certainly not the 
way forward. 
2. Common Timeframes for Nationally Determined Contributions 
In the run-up to the Paris conference, Parties had not been able to agree on any mandatory 
requirements for the content of NDCs. As consequence, the NDCs currently vary strongly in 
many respects, including in the timelines they cover. While some Parties’ NDCs have 2025 as 
target date, most have 2030 and some have even longer timeframes.  
COP21 had therefore mandated the CMA to “consider common time frames at its first ses-
sion”.24 Consequently, the conference in Katowice had agreed that NDCs for the period post-
2030 should adhere to common timeframes, but Parties had not been able to agree on any 
specific proposal. COP24 had therefore mandated the SBI to further consider the issue.25 
–––– 
23  Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, Leading countries set benchmark for carbon markets with San Jose Principles. Press release 
<https://cambioclimatico.go.cr/press-release-leading-countries-set-benchmark-for-carbon-markets-with-san-jose-principles/> accessed 
11 February 2020. 
24  UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016) paras 23–25. 
25 UNFCCC ‘Decision 6/CMA.1, Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the 
Paris Agreement’ UN Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (19 March 2019).  
8
The absence of consensus continued in Madrid. In particular, small island states, least devel-
oped countries (LDCs) and the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) argued for having five-
year cycles as longer timeframes would carry a high risk of locking in insufficient ambition. By 
contrast, the like-minded developing countries suggested that timeframes could be up to 
2030, 2035, 2040, or as decided by the Party. Later in the first week the LMDCs proposed 
differentiated timeframes for mitigation, adaptation, and finance as well as differentiation for 
developing and developed country Parties. Developed country Parties by and large apparent-
ly did not assign high priority to the question, suggesting that the issue could also be resolved 
at a later COP. 
Agreement was arguably made impossible from the start by the limited amount of time that 
was allocated to the topic. While the Presidency had earlier indicated that they considered the 
issue a critical element for an “ambition COP”, in Madrid, initially only two hours of negotia-
tions were scheduled, and subsequently only a small amount of additional time was provid-
ed.26 In the end, Parties were not able to come to a conclusion and the item will be included in 
the agenda of the next session. 
3. Transparency Framework 
At COP24 in Katowice, Parties had agreed on the modalities, procedures and guidelines for 
the Transparency Framework. These rules do not only contain provisions on how Parties are 
to report on their GHG emissions and progress towards implementing their NDCs but they 
also establish international processes to review and assess the reports.27  
In Madrid, Parties were mandated to further specify these provisions by agreeing on outlines 
of reports and reporting tables. In doing so, they had to strike a balance between the objective 
of ensuring that reporting is complete and transparent while at the same time making sure 
that templates can also be used by developing countries with limited capacities. 
Despite significant efforts during the first week of the negotiations, Parties were unable to 
reach consensus on how to continue working on this matter, in particular on whether to under-
take inter-sessional work and give a mandate to the secretariat to make a proposal for com-
mon reporting tables. While some countries (US, EU, AILAC, LDCs, AOSIS, Australia, Cana-
da and Japan) wanted to continue discussing this issue, others (China, LMDC, African Group) 
opposed this and the text was not forwarded to the COP.28 The agenda item will therefore be 
included in the agenda of the next SBSTA session in June 2020. 
IV. Support for the Global South 
1. Adaptation 
Adaptation was a priority issue for many of the developing country Parties. In the opening 
statements of COP2529, a number of Parties highligted the importance of the adaptation fund 
(Australia for the umbrella group), stressed that adaptation and mitigation should be balanced 
–––– 
26 Sharma, Anju, Axel Michaelowa, Aglaja Espelage, Jennifer Allan, Benito Müller (2020): COP25 Key Outcomes. Oxford: European Capacity 
Building Initiative <https://ecbi.org/sites/default/files/COP25%20Key%20Outcomes_0.pdf> accessed 11 February 2020. 
27 see: Wolfgang Obergassel, Christof Arens, Lukas Hermwille, Nicolas Kreibich, Hermann Ott, and Hanna Wang-Helmreich. ‘Paris Agree-
ment: Ship Moves Out of the Drydock’. Carbon and Climate Law Review 13, no. 01 (2019): 3–18. https://doi.org/10.21552/cclr/2019/1/4. 
28 IISD Reporting Services. ‘Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference: Monday, 9 December 2019’. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 12, no. 771 
(2019). https://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12771e.pdf. 
29 Earth Negotiation Bulletin, Vol. 12, pp. 775, Summary of the Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference: 2-15 December 2019, Wednesday 
18 December, http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12775e.pdf. 
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(Egypt for the African Group), that Article 6 should provide resources for adaptation through a 
share of proceeds (Bhutan for the LDCs) or an Art. 6 „adaptation credit“ (Papua New Guinea 
for the Coalition for Rainforest Nations). Brazil (for Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay - ABU), called 
on developed countries to scale up ambition on finance with regard to the GCF and the Adap-
tation Fund. Finally, Venezuela (for ALBA) emphasised its general priority of adaptation over 
mitigation. Compared to the emphasis placed, the discussion was controversial with few re-
sults. 
In Madrid, the report of the Adaptation Committee was discussed in joint SBI/SBSTA informal 
consultations.30 At COP24 in Katowice, the adaptation Committee had been requested to 
consider gaps and needs and how to address them.31 Discussion were from the beginning 
controversial, focusing on the prominence given to the private sector in the Adaptation Com-
mittee’s recommendations.32  Developing countries underscored that adaptation finance 
should be public funds from developed countries. There was also disagreement on how to 
reference the Committee`s recommendations, with some countries objecting reference in any 
form. Controversies remained unresolved with some developing countries calling for inviting 
submissions from Parties by March 2020 and for the Secretariat to compile these into a syn-
thesis report whereas several other developed countries opposed to this. As a result, no 
agreement was found and the item was included in the provisional agenda for SBI 52. 
Issues regarding the membership of the Adaptation Fund board were controversely dis-
cussed. As there were diverging opinions of developing and developed countries on the ne-
cessity to act on this item as well as a controversy on the role of the CMA, Parties were una-
ble to find agreement. Some developing countries stated the Fund was still under the authori-
ty of and accountable to the CMP until a share of proceeds from the Paris Agreement Article 
6 (cooperative approaches) was available.33 The item was also deferred and included in the 
provisional agenda for the next meeting. Regarding finance, the CMP decision welcomed ad-
ditional financial pledges and contributions and highlighted the multi-annual pledge by Ger-
many. Additional funds and voluntary support were again encouraged.  
Discussions on National Adaptation Plans (NAP) were taken up in plenary and informal con-
sultations. Discussions focused on challenges in accessing financial resources for NAP for-
mulation and implementation. In its decision34, the COP takes note of the Adaptation Commit-
tee’s work on gaps and needs and invites Parties to share information on activities to adress 
gaps and needs. Developed countries were urged to mobilise support for adaptation activities 
in developing countries. The decision also notes challenges to access funding from the GCF 
Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme for the formulation of NAPs. SBI is request-
ed to work further on gaps and needs and the implementation of NAPs. 
2. Loss and Damage 
The issue of supporting developing countries in dealing with climate impacts that cannot be 
adapted to, known under the term of “loss and damage”, has been subject to contentious de-
bates for several years now. With the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and 
–––– 
30 UNFCCC ‘Report of the Adaptation Committee’ UN Doc FCCC/SB/2019/3 (10 October 2019). 
31 UNFCCC ‘Decision 11/CMA.1, Matters referred to in paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of decision 1/CP.21’ UN Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 
(19 March 2019), paras 15–17. 
32  Earth Negotiation Bulletin, Vol. 12, pp. 775, Summary of the Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference: 2-15 December 2019, Wednes-
day 18 December, http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12775e.pdf. 
33 Ibid. 
34  UNFCCC ‘Decision -/CP.25, National adaptation plans’ Advance unedited version. 
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Damage, an institution dedicated to deal with climate induced impacts was established by the 
COP in 2013. At COP25 in Madrid, the review of the WIM was one of the key agenda items.  
A key priority for developing countries in Madrid was to strengthen the WIM, so that the 
mechanism could fulfil its hitherto largely neglected mandate to support vulnerable countries 
through the provision of finance, technology and capacity building.  
On finance for loss and damage, one priority for developing countries was to improve vulner-
able countries’ access to new and additional finance for dealing with climate change induced 
loss and damage. This key ask of developing countries was not only discussed in the context 
of the review of the WIM but also subject of discussions on climate finance taking place in 
other negotiation fora. This position of developing countries, that was supported by a large 
number of non-governmental organisations35, encountered fierce opposition of some devel-
oped nations. In particular, the US and Australia opposed the idea of providing new and addi-
tional finance as well as the creation of specific funding windows for loss and damage under 
financial bodies such as the GCF, referring to existing financial support being provided. 
The final decision text36 recognizes the need to provide finance for loss and damage by urg-
ing the “scaling-up of action and support, as appropriate, including finance, technology and 
capacity-building“ (para 32). This decision is an important step forward in establishing loss 
and damage under the financial architecture of the UNFCCC. The text, however, does not 
specifiy who is to scale-up action and support. This omission was criticised by developing 
countries during the final plenary who underscored that they understood this paragraph as 
clearly referring to developed countries. Another weak point from the developing country per-
spective is that the decision does not specify that finance for loss and damage must be new 
and additional. This can be seen as a risk that the funding needed to finance loss and dam-
age will be taken from climate finance streams intended to fund mitigation and adaptation ac-
tions in developing countries, thereby effectively reducing these already insufficient financing 
streams. 
The generic call to scale-up action and support was complemented by a decision to install a 
new expert group at the operational level. One of the expert group’s tasks is to find ways on 
how to enhance the provision of support for dealing with loss and damage and facilitate de-
veloping country’s access to it by inter alia engaging with existing financial institutions under 
the UNFCCC.37 The expert group was however not vested with a mandate to mobilise new 
finance for loss and damage. 
To support the implementation of activities on loss and damage, Parties further agreed on 
establishing the ‘Santiago Network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change’.38 The network is to provide technical 
assistance to key actors involved in the implementation of approaches to address loss and 
damage in particularly vulnerable developing countries. With the installation of the Santiago 
Network the WIM will now be vested with an ‘implementation arm’ that complements the exist-
ing political arm of the WIM, the Executive Committee. 
–––– 
35  Action Aid (2019): More than 150 NGOs sign open letter calling for loss and damage fund with debt relief. 
https://actionaid.org/news/2019/more-150-ngos-sign-open-letter-calling-loss-and-damage-fund-debt-relief 
36  UNFCCC Decision -/CMA.2, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts and its 
2019 review’ Advance unedited version. 
37  ibid paras 40-41. 
38 Ibid para 43. 
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An issue that proved particularly contentious and which could not be resolved was the future 
governance of the WIM. While the mechanism was established by the COP in 2013, it was 
put under the authority and guidance of the CMA with the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 
2015. In an attempt to ensure they would not be subject to any future liability and compensa-
tion claims, the US pushed for the WIM to be operational exclusively under the Paris Agree-
ment. Under such a structure and with the US presumably no longer being a Party to the Par-
is Agreement by the end of 2020, any future obligations for the US under the WIM to support 
developing countries in their efforts to deal with climate induced loss and damage would be-
come obsolete. Developing countries successfully objected the US proposal of the WIM being 
pushed under the CMA and they were also successful in opposing the expansion of a clause 
that would have limited liability and compensation. However, the question of whether the WIM 
will continue being operational under both the COP and the CMA could not be resolved and 
will be taken up at COP26 in Glasgow. 
3. Climate Finance 
In addition to finance for loss and damage, there were also – as always – several other con-
troversial negotiation strands on the provision of financial support from developed to devel-
oped countries. Developed and developing countries once again clashed on the implementa-
tion of the long-term finance pledge made by developed countries in 2009 to mobilise annual-
ly USD 100 billion by 2020. At COP21 in Paris, the pledge was extended to 2025 and a new 
collective finance goal for the period after 2025 is to be discussed in the next years. COP17 in 
Durban had established a work programme on the implementation of the long-term finance 
pledge, which COP19 in Warsaw had extended until 2020. In Madrid, the G77&China pro-
posed to establish a permanent forum on long-term finance, arguing that the issue required 
regular discussions from a strategic perspective. Developed countries, however, were op-
posed and Parties were not even able to come to a consensus that discussions should con-
tinue at COP26. In the end, Rule 16 was applied, which means that the agenda item will au-
tomatically be included in the agenda of the next session in Glasgow.39 
Further controversies surrounded the work to be requested from the Standing Committee on 
Finance (SCF), which was established in 2010 to assist the COP on financial matters. Devel-
oping countries demanded that the SCF should be mandated to develop a “common” defini-
tion of climate finance that all Parties agree on. As in the past, developed countries opposed 
to elaboration of such a common definition, which makes it difficult to assess implementation 
of the USD 100 billon pledge. Developed countries also rejected demands by developing 
countries to have the SCF assess the achievement of the pledge. Furthermore, developed 
countries rejected calls by developing countries to include loss and damage in the SCF’s up-
coming quadrennial assessment of implementation needs of developing countries.40 
The work plan finally agreed on only underscores the SCF’s contribution to the operational 
definitions of climate finance. In addition, it invites submissions on this issue by 30 April 2020, 
to assist the SCF in preparing its 2020 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance 
Flows.  Furthermore, the Decision encourages the SCF to present, “to the extent possible”, 
disaggregated information on climate finance flows and needs of developing countries, includ-
ing information on data availability and gaps by sector. On loss and damage, the Decision 
–––– 
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notes the inputs the SCF provided to the technical paper on sources of and modalities for ac-
cessing financial support for addressing loss and damage; and looks forward to future input 
from the WIM to the SCF on its work to develop draft guidance for the Green Climate Fund 
and the Global Environment Facility.41 
 
 
V. Gender Action Plan 
One of the strongest outcomes of COP25 was the adoption of the 5-year Enhanced Gender 
Action Plan (GAP) under the UNFCCC by Parties.42 The COP confirmed the GAP adopted in 
2017 as part of the agreed review of the Lima Work Programme on Gender. Despite a dra-
matic negotiation process on these cross-cutting dimensions of UNFCCC policies, in the end 
there was no backlash on the differentiated UNFCC efforts on reducing the gender bias of 
international climate policy. On the contrary, Parties strengthened the GAP with two new ac-
tivities: targeted capacity building for the advancement of gender-responsive climate solutions 
at all levels, and strengthening and accelerating implementation. The COP decision re-
iterates language from the preamble of the Paris Agreement, according to which parties 
should, when taking action to address climate change, “respect, promote, and consider their 
respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, 
local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities, and people in vulnerable situ-
ations [...] as well as gender equality, empowerment of women, and intergenerational equi-
ty”.43  
The enhanced GAP “sets out objectives and activities under five priority areas that aim to ad-
vance knowledge and understanding of gender-responsive climate action and its coherent 
mainstreaming in the implementation of the UNFCCC and the work of Parties, the secretariat, 
United Nations entities and all stakeholders at all levels, as well as women’s full, equal and 
meaningful participation in the UNFCCC process”.44 The enhanced GAP defines 2-7 activities 
for each of the objectives in the five priority areas, for which clear provisions are made with 
regard to a) Responsibilities: leading responsibility in each case, and contributing responsibili-
ties (e.g. Parties, UNFCCC Secretariat, chairs of constituted bodies, “relevant organisations”, 
national gender and climate change focal points, “relevant national financial and budgeting 
institutions”, “research community” etc.), b) Timeline (e.g. until COP28 in 2022 or a fixed date 
within the next 5 years), c) Deliverables/outputs (guidelines, implementation of capacity build-
ing, etc.), d) Level(s) of implementation (e.g. at international, regional and/or national level). 
However, clearly defined indicators for measuring progress are lacking. And two fundamental 
gender and climate transformation dimensions in particular are missing: Agreements on cli-
mate and sufficiency rights of households, care givers and the population to infrastructure 
systems, services and sustainable livelihoods, which are essential for meeting climate targets, 
on the one hand, and on the other hand agreements on goals and responsibilities for actively 
–––– 
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44 Ibid, Annex, Gender Action Plan, para 1. 
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limiting the structural production of energy and transport burdens and needs45 , at the ex-
pense of women, care giving and inclusive societies as well as of climate and sustainability.46  
The NGO Life e.V. criticises the GAP for recognising the intersectional identities of women, 
including indigenous women and women with disabilities, but “more work needs to be done to 
understand the multidimensional and non-binary social intersections that impact the ways in 
which people mitigate to and build resilience to climate impacts.”47  
And the NGOs also criticise the overall outcome of the COP25 with regard to gender: "No real 
action on gender equality can be achieved without progress from Parties to fully implement 
the Paris Agreement, including to limiting warming to 1.5 degrees”.48  
The COP25 decision includes to undertake a review of the implementation of the enhanced 
Lima Work Programme and its GAP at SBI 61 (2024) and to conduct an intermediate review 
of the progress of implementation of the activities contained in the GAP at SBI 56 (June 
2022). Parties are encouraged to appoint and provide support for a national gender and cli-
mate change focal point for climate negotiations, implementation, and monitoring.49  
 
VI. Conclusions and Outlook 
1. A Matter of Overblown Expectations? 
Public reactions to the COP outcome were mostly harsh. Even UN Secretary-General António 
Guterres expressed disappointment: “The international community lost an important oppor-
tunity to show increased ambition on mitigation, adaptation, and  nance to tackle the climate 
crisis.”50  
As some have pointed out, this prevailing sense of disappointment was at least partly due to 
the large gap between the increasing public demand for swift and strong climate action, ex-
emplified by the strong presence of climate activists in Madrid, and the actual mandate of the 
conference. Its main objective was to finalise the Paris rulebook and thereby prepare for the 
start of the implementation of the Paris Agreement.51 
–––– 
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49 See footnote 42. 
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However, COP25 failed even on these relatively modest tasks. A record number of issues 
were left unresolved and shelved for the next session, including not only Article 6 but also 
common time frames, long-term finance, transparency issues for the Paris Agreement, the 
report of the Adaptation Committee, and the report of the Consultative Group of Experts. 
Many observers could tally only the outcomes on the two issues of realising gender respon-
siveness and human rights, and loss and damage as substantive wins.52 So even if measured 
by the modest standard of what was officially on the agenda, COP25 must be considered a 
failure.  
2. The Last Stand of Fossil Interests? 
Some commentators have argued that the conflicts at COP25 show that the time of cosmetic 
climate policy has come to an end. In their view, countries that are strongly tied to fossil fuels 
are now feeling the bite of the Paris Agreement and trying to organise massive resistance, but 
the majority of countries wants to lift climate policy to a new level.53 
However, the countries blocking progress at COP25 are merely the tip of the iceberg. While 
adhering to the Paris Agreement in their rhetoric, in practice none of the major emitters are 
yet ready to seriously embark on a trajectory that is consistent with the objectives of the 
agreement. Even the efforts of countries such as Germany and the UK that are or used to be 
widely seen as frontrunners have been rated as “highly insufficent” and “insufficient” by the 
Climate Action Tracker.54 Even within the confines of the UNFCCC’s consensus system, 
blockers would have a much harder time if there was a counterweight of other major emitters 
actually committed to the cause. 
The outcome of COP25 is thus a true reflection of the current state of climate policy. The con-
ference was not able to complete the Paris rulebook and sent only a muted signal on the 
need for more action. It was not even able to agree on milestones for the process in 2020. In 
order to facilitate an initial global evaluation before the next conference in Glasgow in No-
vember 2020, all contributions should be on the table by the middle of next year at the latest.  
Whether 2020 will become the year of ambition raising will to a large extent depend on the 
EU. Ursula von der Leyen, the new President of the European Commission, tried to regain the 
position of climate leader for the EU with her intervention at COP25. She declared that the EU 
wanted to be “the first climate neutral continent by 2050” and that to achieve this objective 
action had to be taken now.55 The EU and China have scheduled a summit for September to 
help prepare the next COP in Glasgow. This summit will only be a success if the EU does not 
come empty-handed. The EU should take a decision before the summit with China to 
strengthen its emission reduction target for 2030. To make this possible, the European Com-
mission should publish its proposal for the target revision within the first 100 days of the new 
Commission, as von der Leyen had initially announced. If the Commission publishes its pro-
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posal later, this will likely not leave enough time for the EU to come to an agreement before 
September.  
Given its high historical emissions and high economic capability, the EU has the responsibility 
to take the lead and not wait for moves from others before taking its decision. The EU as a 
whole should therefore follow the example of Denmark, which recently adopted binding legis-
lation to reduce its emissions by at least 70% below 1990 levels by 2030. 
Holding the EU Council presidency in the second half of 2020, Germany will have a key role 
in the positioning of the EU. The German government therefore needs to reclaim a frontrun-
ner position and end its current blockade of ambitious measures at national and European 
level, for the benefit of the climate – but also of the German economy, which has significant 
potential on the growing international climate protection markets. Given that Germany is set to 
miss its 2020 climate targets by a wide margin, forces now need to be joined to increase the 
targets for 2030 and securely achieve them. The climate protection programme that has so 
far been developed and enacted by the German government falls far short in this regard. 
3. From Negotiation to Action 
Another development in climate diplomacy concerns the increasingly important role of non-
state and subnational actors. While those actors and their actions cannot and should not re-
place action at the national level, their activities can support NDC implementation and facili-
tate ambition by influencing policy formulation at the domestic level. Civil society involvement 
and gender responsiveness increases legitimacy and authority of NDC decision making 
through stakeholder participation and by acting as a watchdog supporting transparency and 
accountability of national governments.56  
With the process of regime building coming closer to its completion, it is high time to shift 
away the focus of ”negotiation COPs“ to events that highlight and put center stage the action 
developed by non-state and subnational actors and to seek ways to more formally interlink 
the Global Climate Action Agenda with the intergovernmental process.57 For example, the 
COP could formally take note of the climate action pathways developed by the Global Climate 
Action Agenda and/or even endorse them so that they receive some form of legitimation and 
authority. This, in turn, might help to raise their prominance and increase the likelihood that 
this stream of work is actually picked up by national governments in a constructive manner.  
4. Fast Track Needed 
While the results of COP25 are sobering, to say the least, it is worth mentioning that the multi-
lateral process under the UNFCCC is and remains a crucial element to advance climate ac-
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tion across the globe.58 First and foremost, it is the only universal forum in which all Countries 
including the least powerful have a say.59 Moreover, the adoption of the Paris Agreement has 
achieved major paradigm shifts. It shifted the global climate discourse towards the 1.5 °C tar-
get, it provides a reference point for civil society including the Fridays for Future movement, 
and the adoption of the “finance objective” (Art. 2.1c of the Paris Agreement) initiated a para-
digm shift in the global financial system with more and more (development) banks figuring out 
ways to redirect financial flows into climate-compatible investments.60 Moreover, that Paris 
Agreement and its implementation process are advancing the integration of human rights and 
the UN gender mainstreaming imperatives61 into climate policy, notably by the adoption of the 
UNFCCC Gender Action Plan in 2017 and now the adoption of the Enhanced GAP in Madrid. 
Still, the talks in Madrid illustrated once more that substantial progress within the limits of the 
mutlilateral consensus-based climate regime remains extremely difficult. Arguably, it will nev-
er allow for a sufficient pace of progress. Should the alliance between the EU, China and oth-
er countries not evolve and pull the process out of the current limbo, civil society and ambi-
tious countries must seriously consider establishing an international process parallel to the 
current regime of UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement.62 COP25 has demonstrat-
ed that the obstructive power of a handful of countries is able not only to hold the process but 
to turn the Paris Agreement into the opposite direction. The next conference might thus see 
the worst possible outcome – weak ambition with no substantial improvement of most Parties’ 
NDCs, very weak implementation of the Enhanced Transparency Framework and yawning 
loopholes. The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and the legally binding target of the Paris 
Agreement to keep warming well below two degrees would be thwarted and impossible to 
reach. Worst nightmares would become true and multilateral approaches as such seriously 
damaged – much to the liking of the new nationalist sentiments in various parts of the world. 
There are, however, multilateral approaches that are not necessarily global or universal in 
character. In its original meaning, “multi-lateral” means affairs between more than two coun-
tries. In the past two decades, this term has come to denote “global” affairs between the al-
most 200 nation states and the EU. In order to distinguish those approaches from less-than-
universal coverage, one might call them “minilateral”.63 In any case, it is important to remem-
ber that also the most successful international environmental treaty, the now universal Mon-
treal Protocol, started between 24 committed countries. There are some aspects – speed, 
ambition, participation and equity – that are frequently mentioned as to why groups with a lim-
ited membership of governments may be an effective mechanism for change.64 
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61  Resolution, Declaration and Platform for Action of UN Fourth World Women Conference in Beijing 1995, UN document A/CONF.177/20, 
17.10.1995: https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Beijing_Declaration_and_Platform_for_Action.pdf (last access 10.02.2020).  
62  See e.g. Obergassel et al.: Phoenix from the Ashes – Analysis of the Paris Agreement to the UNFCCC, 28 ELM 2016, p.3 at p.12 et seq. 
63  See Falkner, Robert (2016). ‘A minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Efficiency, Club Benefits, and Internation-
al Legitimacy’. Perspectives on Politcs, vol. 14, no 1, pp.87-101. 
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Ideally, such a group of forerunners would form under the umbrella of the UNFCCC by nego-
tiating and adopting a new protocol containing ambitious rules for those who sign up to it.65 
But unfortunately, such a protocol would have to be negotiated by all Parties and thus – even 
if allowed to go ahead - would not have any chance of containing binding rules or even effec-
tive decision-making procedures. The situation reminds of heroin addicts who vow solemnly 
to become clean – but also stipulate that all measures must be agreed by everyone. This “de-
tox by consensus” would not get very far, especially since the dealers are part of the group, 
who will lose economically if the structural production of energy, transport, material and other 
climate relevant needs (see section V) and “consumption” is effectively reduced (and emanci-
pative sufficiency rights of care givers and the population take effect). 
Any such attempt to establish a more effective regime must therefore start as a parallel pro-
cess independent from the UNFCCC, but respecting human rights and intersectional gender 
equality imperatives. It is politically not easy to forge a new agreement on a subject matter 
that is already regulated, but it is not legally prohibited since the current climate regime is not 
exclusive. It is also important to note that this fast track must be built on a solid legal founda-
tion. There are, of course, good reasons in some situations to revert to more flexible “soft law” 
approaches, but if the agreement contains legally binding obligations (and it should) and es-
pecially if there are trade implications this must be done by hard law in order to comply with 
the international trade regime. This fast track Decarbonization treaty should contain legally 
binding reduction targets, a market regime with border tax adjustments for raw materials and 
products, gender responsiveness (not least in order to be able to follow pathways that are 
adequate to real-life adequate conditions) and a fund to make it attractive for the financially 
weaker members of the club. In addition, care needs to be taken that treaties developed out-
side the UN framework also adher to all sustainable development, human rights and gender 
equality and mainstreaming obligations that have been adopted within the UN. A constructive 
and pragmatic way forward would be to consider transnational decarbonization clubs that ad-
dres specific sectoral transformation challenges, for instance in the iron and steel industry.66   
Preparations for such a diplomatic process should start immediately in order to be able to 
commence after COP26 in Glasgow 2020. The issue could already be part of the EU-China 
negotiations, with all Parties expressing the firm intention to aim at a separate agreement 
should next year’s conference have unsatisfactory results. The mere threat of such a fast 
track process might already induce some much-needed urgency into the preparations for 
COP26. Civil society engagement and gender responsiveness will be vital for such an en-
deavour. There are many examples that a coalition of committed NGOs and of gender and 
climate justice representation are able to instigate and ultimately drive a diplomatic process – 
examples are the coalitions that pushed for the International Criminal Court or the Interna-
tional Treaty to Ban Land-Mines.  
Needless to say, all diplomatic efforts in the coming months must go towards making COP26 
a success. The challenge is enormous, similar to the conferences in Kyoto 1997, The Hague 
2000, Copenhagen 2009 or Paris 2015. The record is a draw with two conferences successful 
and two a failure. Much depends on the Presidency – a successful conference requires a dili-
–––– 
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gent, participatory, creative and trustworthy pre-COP diplomacy. The UK has a proven track 
record as conference host and might, despite the turbulences caused by the Brexit process, 
be capable of delivering. The other ingredient for a successful COP is also given – a man-
ageable, practical work programme that is not overloaded with ambition. COP21 in Paris has 
laid the foundation for a process that is built on consensus, aims for saving our civilization 
from climate catastrophy and establishes procedures for each country to determine its own 
share to reach this goal. It’s absolutely doable, nothing utopian. What is needed now is the 
political will by the major emitters to live up to the promises they made some five years ago 
and to substantially increase their national contributions. If they fail, history will judge them 
harshly.  
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